Hancitor — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3af1f23c945a8790…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

534.5 KB Created: 2021-10-19 14:09:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: ef8cf02b28315daff8ea591bc351976b SHA-1: 0bc5d06813f9c5aba1369e705dafbc1546c54e4f SHA-256: 3af1f23c945a8790a256c5cd13bd6f1d29ab5cfa6d40ce88e44aebba33696922
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is detected as malicious by ClamAV with the signature 'Doc.Downloader.Hancitor10210-9903725-0', indicating the Hancitor family. The VBA macro 'Document_Open' is designed to execute upon opening the document. It attempts to create a file named 'zo.doc' and establish persistence by writing to the registry key 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy'. The macro also attempts to open a document with the password 'doyouknowthatthegodsofdeathonlyeatapples?', suggesting a multi-stage infection process.

Heuristics 6

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Hancitor10210-9903725-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Hancitor10210-9903725-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/encryption
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/keyEncryptor/password
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/keyEncryptor/certificate
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0f66e8b0976dfa1fe567b1dc29fee8e23ed085308518898b6cdda18441ac4ff8		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3628 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
9568e0188f482ae50396bc8caaf09c86bdcb4599d6fa54b07a0a6268a6e9fce6		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1696132559/Ole10Native 349987 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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