Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3aeabd994e43002f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

172.4 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: a516342874c8b4a490ae5a6ab492b71a SHA-1: d8bc5fbf5b52ea146a7e72c314bc7960606a5b96 SHA-256: 3aeabd994e43002f5cdc8b0d7e03625d21153cd4128f5d41ee8ede747eda1499
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

The sample is an OLE document with a significant amount of slack space, indicating obfuscation. Heuristics indicate the use of VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, suggesting the loading of a malicious DLL. The absence of a document body and scripts prevents a more specific determination of the attack pattern or family.

Heuristics 4

  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 176,541 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 151,976 bytes (86%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API