Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a9a3c04c21479f2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

312.0 KB Created: 2010-02-10 15:34:59 +01:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.1) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: bf250b206e24a15e377b2cfd83ae41fc SHA-1: a8dd38aeb169c1619ced0bdafa7be4a873c32f9e SHA-256: 3a9a3c04c21479f24bba63bbe59b233ba3e5d8d2b7e5de0532ce50f988341d80
678 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF exploits CVE-2010-1240 by using a launch action to execute cmd.exe. The embedded JavaScript uses the exportDataObject API to drop a Windows executable disguised as 'fireforce_en_manual.pdf'. The executable is likely a second-stage payload, as indicated by the ClamAV detection of 'Win.Trojan.Rozena-131' on the extracted artifact. The embedded URL points to a potential distribution point for the payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9978

Heuristics 15

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\fireforce_en_manual.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.scrt.ch/pages/fireforce/fireforce.xpi PDF link annotation
    • https://addons.mozilla.org/In PDF document text
    • https://addons.mozilla.org/fr/firefox/addon/64765In PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign: scrt.ch 9 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
fireforce_en_manual.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 117 at offset 0x48EF8 37888 bytes
SHA-256: ae9d70b5a3c0d16d21e0cd7bc9ba8ce2e558011e3dc57eaf132ecbc17ed0682d
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=fireforce_en_manual.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0118_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 118 at offset 0x4DBEE 68 bytes
SHA-256: b3ab59ef0991703642c254951e7abe08e89d16ec0cabbcd0e5e15fcb035348da
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "fireforce_en_manual", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_015_off00021f16.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x21F16 141456 bytes
SHA-256: ff027821eb6007ec65a781497bd42ff1224c6e86627a835a21918243177fa016
font_00_sfnt_off00030f57.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x30F57 50064 bytes
SHA-256: 0c121c1d9e5581f510bf188fdc999257dd1ff98e8e8d1cd9dff6320d0f1b0cef
font_01_sfnt_off00039ab2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x39AB2 23660 bytes
SHA-256: f9a91f613dbb4d56f9ed40f918f570a675d183aaca071d9f4ec8be374dd410e0
font_02_sfnt_off0003d8a0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3D8A0 1752 bytes
SHA-256: 91f45c017129d958d1920306f07fa9749d3785d1d4ed389596a3aaf1b2a86cab
font_03_sfnt_off0003dec0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3DEC0 25728 bytes
SHA-256: 70d40c52e0c77968d814d172f3a7e706a3494fc9453731f532a5a2480b2f19d7
font_04_sfnt_off0004228f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4228F 25360 bytes
SHA-256: 8928f8132c0d25b8b12de8688704e4e0a2b2493dbf4979b8e35a8310410430b7

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.