Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a787a7b850b92a9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

1.35 MB Created: 2022-02-23 14:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-04-06
MD5: 2c36ea17310355d0629f9436847e2dc3 SHA-1: c411741ed4713f111948ff85f580fdbf23d81f76 SHA-256: 3a787a7b850b92a99d20f52747f1e13428039a149b7dd6295f6ca11995d88e0a
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a DOCM file containing VBA macros. The AutoClose macro is designed to write a binary payload to the user's startup folder, specifically at 'C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\DnsSystem.exe'. This indicates an attempt to establish persistence for a second-stage payload. The presence of an 'enable lure' heuristic further supports the malicious intent of the document.

Heuristics 5

  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f038676b05782f8a579978faf135d4a8a505409365df7f6135a62ad04a942dc6
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1274 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
bb4498d6ef181e7ce0d4bf3c5e391f67c74be26cbbe3d7e512030b1caab5585f
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 19968 bytes