Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a675b3c98999d88…

MALICIOUS

RTF

39.0 KB First seen: 2023-07-10
MD5: 5bc3e77d81966ad07b31088aa6312d05 SHA-1: 3618b9c332c94369172628e36cf4762b4da36546 SHA-256: 3a675b3c98999d8816eee415eb6e28a21f46548fcb0a9faa600b587cf77a7681
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, and an objupdate directive that forces OLE activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content. This combination strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000051ab.bin
4193d8c54aa5212df908c1636aea4f54bde5b3634c8c3ce2b7c27a75caeac88c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x51AB 1503 bytes