Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a64337005639985…

MALICIOUS

RTF

36.3 KB First seen: 2023-07-04
MD5: 5d392bce63c065860ea2dc900e862c49 SHA-1: 145be3864b6cf4cd55962a41f3dabfd56f204b37 SHA-256: 3a64337005639985f7d55367e805b8446db8b20b2b1f79254382262c06135ac1
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation and automatic OLE activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass macro security. This suggests the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability, likely within the Equation Editor component, to execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005284.bin
8e3d07a204ef75d6df01e9a326458cd8ef1aad6f39c554dd1ff54a95f9723271
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5284 1710 bytes