Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a37b9500479fd71…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

401.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-10
MD5: bb373869ae152c370a51d4e63a242c95 SHA-1: 9d323582ac8f107a20c6c6a844d3b36b2ca31fa5 SHA-256: 3a37b9500479fd715439fa3f634a3cffbc5ad9f8c7766cf7204e1e035e72072e
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882 indicates that this Excel file contains a malicious Equation Editor object designed to exploit this vulnerability. The presence of an OLE object with a payload further supports this finding. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting the exploit is delivered via the OLE object rather than macro code.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
5c702afdd93888e2fc40ab27196548482f6ceaed05a543f96e8d532cc2c4a1bc
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD021D75D7/OLE10naTIVe 1347 bytes