RTF malware analysis — malicious · 3a3263be70516982

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.54 MB First seen: 2020-07-24

MD5: d946f576abc84bb04eab2c715ec503f5 SHA-1: 5a342fe9debdd3a7b83e56f35854413c43f0d76e SHA-256: 3a3263be705169825341044b44888157736e1e5ffa88f48a638d277ed386f9d5

242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a decoded payload indicative of the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The document body contains a lure to 'Enable Editing', suggesting the user interaction is required to trigger the exploit. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload, although no specific download URL or script was directly extracted.

Heuristics 7

Decoded Equation Editor payload + PE critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF decodes to an Equation Editor ProgID adjacent to OLE activation and the same decoded object stream contains embedded PE bytes. This matches the Equation Editor exploit surface used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 documents, while requiring payload evidence to avoid flagging benign Equation references.
Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX

RTF contains ~1614KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000008b.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x8B	807450 bytes
SHA-256: `869642a9f1d89fa2402245908391e84de8a6a9b8c5ba039a95df35f41f557ba7`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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