Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a32453d2296c5e9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.2 KB
MD5: 44aa03495be448d54275c2127b05ce48 SHA-1: 2104d263f8ffebd554be62f8128b3fbd774e9314 SHA-256: 3a32453d2296c5e90bcc8e1330b5bc15297486a0275e5a228100008162b7e10e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b2.bin
2518de4dafb948a425ba3e81eacc92562fbc4de3a0c73c803c321363bba7f842
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB2 1451 bytes