Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a21cba4f88cd5ea…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.5 KB
MD5: 2ff10a31d1a1c25f85dea29a9ff501ac SHA-1: e369dd29d7202ebec0fc84f75b38ccae56e1b88b SHA-256: 3a21cba4f88cd5ea8cac812fc4937c849b6af4600d73d62aa9fce030a0a3511a
138 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious PDF T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms, to execute arbitrary code. The embedded script payload within the XFA form is indicative of a downloader or dropper mechanism. While the script content is heavily obfuscated, the presence of XFA and the specific CVE exploit strongly suggest an attempt to compromise the user's system, likely for further malware deployment.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
e33abb0dfe417beeee70d9d4ca3d3de992b6e02812d499e8cf24a053949e0c71		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101147 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.