Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3a0d915cf32e53b3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

323.8 KB Created: 2022-08-05 07:19:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-05
MD5: cb527e5040b56731519adec5ce8f3883 SHA-1: 67e71f68404984ef25350bc4eedff6d21645dcf3 SHA-256: 3a0d915cf32e53b3d79b94917673b08f7dc7a9fd332662797d3dbcdd151444a0
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The critical heuristic 'OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE' indicates that the embedded OLE package is configured to drop an auto-executable payload, specifically mentioning a JAR extension. The presence of embedded OLE objects and extracted artifacts further supports this finding. The file is therefore likely a dropper for a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
158d9aedc9de57ec4f57849652c9fc1fa5a05799b7fafb8e0ca4a44010594a6a		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 195072 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
69b25722bdbbf636633f66548e34cf89b5278b8b413d30831b77884a40ff3415		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 190512 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
738fb3a6e198a5f488716fa6c6610bec15177a4964d1f12eeeeff1c278e79c0c		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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