RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 39f9e4df37b9d4b3

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

341.2 KB

MD5: dc9a33a35b76796e46c64dd1b464b12f SHA-1: a235e802a62465a8985af532730d89e60f17f982 SHA-256: 39f9e4df37b9d4b3e5ad5df753c9e8c3617472f3cfa778e43ddd822544455788

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object activation to execute embedded code. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further confirms that the document likely contains instructions to the user to enable content, a common lure technique for macro-based malware delivery. No scripts were extracted, and no specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000969.bin` `083ccab35f263c2f92d018d45b2ff02ab437ec576375c7ad60937414cb2fc72e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x969	75732 bytes
`objdata_01_off0002715c.bin` `f4c761490fd63fc4aa791746a9a2b588dafd9e2c764f57f0c85377b99ef07062`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2715C	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off000286ff.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x286FF	12297 bytes

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