Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 39f063e018301904…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.7 KB Created: 2020-04-04 08:31:31 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: def7f1c5d9e5c83524bd33230847bc14 SHA-1: 203ca1d85969ec6aba22884c79a1e5bd43a95b81 SHA-256: 39f063e018301904dc02d3256d61a8eecc426a2f4330b1df44ebccac4381c0ee
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, a technique often used for SEO manipulation or to distribute malware. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs suggest a malicious intent to redirect the user to potentially harmful content or to engage in link farming. The primary attack pattern observed is the mass distribution of external links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://weedvillehabadashery.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130476089/130476089.html#como+se+realiza+un+informe+de+trabajo+de+campo
    • http://thebrowarchetek.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740553/vutinunuxanoke.pdf
    • http://birdman2020.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775196/5064fb171d2a72.pdf
    • http://astray.xyz/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775594/gasowofumexaba.pdf
    • http://anoeil.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130590162/jajijeru.pdf
    • http://weareu-46.org/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620767/039a98.pdf
    • http://rjpropertiesgroup.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130288301/nixikezibipaxuji.pdf
    • http://meganlmacdonald.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739046/8787356.pdf
    • http://englishfacultyaphs.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130289240/zedaja_nuzuwuxow_pemizovodigimo.pdf
    • http://chatsaubain.be/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813785/nuxaponarexepuwisofi.pdf
    • http://katyconroy.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130551366/jikujovafinumadalak.pdf
    • http://lonestartoastmasters.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454090/laroku.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00009898.bin
e873b4bbb5dce844e0e9c2557593802ad0b537913dd82999e97206b3fcf880c1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9898 9220 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000b976.bin
85b7d9ec8e93a23b599aeb659e36781aa03f352eeef25ea6e5c6fd831c9ef4dc		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB976 2732 bytes

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