Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 39ee7f4a8af1c3e6…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.4 KB First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: 52c10210fba23269bae59df8409c32ed SHA-1: f9a62969b7e7eb2e794c45ce0ad65a3123cb7a33 SHA-256: 39ee7f4a8af1c3e646bb70ffee739272b5a842817594037af8e7932145e5d3ed
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and triggers an \objupdate event, which are indicators of an Equation Editor exploit. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, likely for downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The specific exploit used is identified as a critical heuristic firing.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3C 1706 bytes
SHA-256: 04ad86b2de799455ec61e252b7a16eec49f0dd50f4589d0af68bea9b77fc99b6