Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 39e2a7aebe3542b3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.27 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 447225e0d19daba3ebaa394a72b72318 SHA-1: ade2804cac4b052d9fb2af635dd2b7e4dd960853 SHA-256: 39e2a7aebe3542b3caf9fca72de467f409766056a29923042ec91c5140503409
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering heuristics for Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759. The ".objupdate" heuristic indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. The presence of these critical heuristics strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001389e2.bin
6d7baafde49b3791acd5f9cd040a5671a53549674753a0acbab6643966babe4e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1389E2 3739 bytes

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