Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 39df72573f895324…

MALICIOUS

PDF

115.5 KB Created: 2011-04-18 15:20:20 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 2.2)
MD5: fc65a23d98ad937568d0044c4b39852c SHA-1: 6df7566547a02910c1bb35b75a8167a9939a74cb SHA-256: 39df72573f8953247d2fa7d6895fcb4fc9a92e0a46aa39d324697e827f96ba23
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF document contains embedded Flash content that is exploited via CVE-2011-0611. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of multiple embedded PDF objects and suspicious static findings within them further indicates a complex malicious structure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9839

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objstm_0026_00.bin
0841ed6ca2149b386133777ff3868f6222ba5033d6f52cd654a117610818bd40		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 26 0 obj (inflated) 1084 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000c101.pdf
b81ac38ac0504f773c69f8850651a7eda43def38500a9eacd9ff477c791c9970		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xC101 68890 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001b62e.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1B62E 6125 bytes

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