Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 39deba345f3ea259…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.2 KB Created: 2021-08-23 17:19:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: 2379994a4c1cb9a7fed083550e1b2902 SHA-1: 14a0916cac473c35cf53e4027532c1a4f466362e SHA-256: 39deba345f3ea2597ec691c019c1b41425b89a3b39483bfd68473e5a7ecd9433
296 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded script content and multiple heuristics indicate malicious intent, including a lure to execute commands via the clipboard and a matched sequence for running PowerShell commands. The embedded script metadata also references 'Run powershell command from batch file', reinforcing the attack pattern. The presence of numerous links to potentially compromised or disposable hosting sites suggests a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9932

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://phoiinnhiet.com/images/uploads/files/13146820719.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://nadinerogger.ch/userfiles/files/86009159071.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ltgpartners.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ea45cbf7b02b6861acede5488b2bd000/juwepiborapufobibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://atya.eu/files/file/99477482205.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noks.cz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c0e3110b20c---50539474763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kubak-ubezpieczenia.pl/userfiles/file/kulenugozowipop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://american-security-inc.com/assets/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dirotasiwanug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gancza-yacht.pl/userfiles/file/nesikekomosupotivasud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pizzeriagiganti.ro/imagini_ws/jixiguvekoxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://urbanshapes.in/userfiles/file/fegedinoroxufemi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hongshengfish.com/uploadfiles/20210628/210628014319749808xf1dup8xb1gx.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vernadoc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c6d0b26b228a64a391247463afc9a230/zoneremefabavufuzepunofu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://finatwork.com/userfiles/file/nuvazugumapalopevir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.goldenlantern.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160850200e9bf8---14540813263.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anhuizpyy.com/upload_fck/file/2021-5-1/20210501042643956986.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.azulejositurry.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/n8ag3321u5a2jijbemn3m57963/5578683588.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.reliancecareuk.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dcf37c4a39eb2aa23d83aa0943122b95/fijug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yuktiedu.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fa768807908de5f428af1a3b8c3ac473/890218982.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://barcabianca.eu/upload/file/sedajawenokilapodukipu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aliencosmicexpo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160982c0b72139---pafetevofomese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://triumphtoday.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609800c80f079---16192578243.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reutlinger.pl/userfiles/file/2485422516.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://godparents4tz.org/home/god/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/57181759127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://malopolskiszlakwinny.pl/upload/File/98495887821.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://meteosputnik.ru/userfiles/file/91787254980.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://barnesfamilyre-union.com/clients/52050/File/kofaxerulofilubazipol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=run+powershell+command+from+batch+filePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00016793.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x16793 1597 bytes
SHA-256: 8efc5c66c353df77cb3e2e0345e4974bb79fd5d1754c0225e9da7fdf2ceeb809
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='GIMP'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Tukohaca Geruge</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Run powershell command from batch file.   Aside - This post has received many tangential questions in the comments. Your best bet at getting</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Run powershell command from batch file.   Aside - This post has received many tangential questions in the comments. Your best bet at getting</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Run powershell command from batch file</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='GIMP'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-24T08:12:37'
  xmp:CreatorTool='GIMP'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='0860d450-8725-4948-98de-bb969f380fc3'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='933bd9ee-1c48-4c64-b5a8-890702c8e145'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000f9d6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9D6 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off000111e8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x111E8 18736 bytes
SHA-256: 3b3ae95190a7881570ff1591fea35ac39858a886ff0059043700e1c65b59387c
font_02_sfnt_off00014439.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14439 11256 bytes
SHA-256: 94054bbc4745395227041fd4d3738178bb0fbea4f8761e71a1781422e6f4dc55

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