Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 39cd2c31e18d5d43…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

60.5 KB First seen: 2023-09-15
MD5: ced11a282a581224ba5d189ab246d3ca SHA-1: 8bd857ee98b4dfa72b28df5996471a8be6b156a3 SHA-256: 39cd2c31e18d5d43bcd927edbddf20fc81e8e898c435a055a14ca13f6a444f16
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to automatically activate the embedded object upon opening. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002b5f.bin
a42d82329fc20128de1c8f8aace0c3d6575e3551077cfaa62e8e46e4ed20ac53
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2B5F 1741 bytes