Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 39c889d91c4bc0fe…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

271.4 KB
MD5: 28baa3fb9c80b7604bbc81962e5414b3 SHA-1: 6b61e6dc6eeeab42d9665659e3bc353bb913716d SHA-256: 39c889d91c4bc0fe97e2c565d3a0e103372ba15f988872d049b9277473a87e24
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including an automatically linked object with an update trigger. This suggests an attempt to exploit OLE object activation to execute embedded code. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic further indicates the document is designed to trick the user into enabling content execution. No specific family could be identified, and no scripts or external URLs were extracted.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
5a738390952b3a302445b07e3fc8b673c152e8110e913c76a7839e7912908d4b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 41390 bytes
objdata_01_off00015a54.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15A54 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off00016ff7.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16FF7 12297 bytes