MALICIOUS
294
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1539 Steal or Harvest Credentials
The PDF contains a lure to copy 'ssh key to clipboard' and paste it into a shell, as indicated by the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' and 'SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE' heuristics. The embedded URL 'https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=copy+ssh+key+to+clipboard' directly supports this attack pattern. Additionally, the PDF acts as a link farm, with many links pointing to shopify.com, suggesting an attempt to distribute malicious content or phish users.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 7
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PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINKPDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
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Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARMSmall PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
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Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LUREDocument requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
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Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINKPDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
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Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LUREDocument tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=copy+ssh+key+to+clipboard In PDF document text
- http://files.azrielbermant.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813965/100239.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://jiniju.skinnypigbreeder.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409309/2c252638bb1803.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://files.reaysplace.com.au/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776619/c8bdf.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://files.bellevuebritishblues.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738924/sinupo-fikojika.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://files.itqansports.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303353/5213518.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3004/3041/files/docker_mount_current_directory.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5258/9465/files/39013538043.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5681/6540/files/rosix.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2340/8032/files/ziritapigutivederis.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6500/7509/files/satofukomogivemuzuwi.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4136/4890/files/zekujog.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8806/0321/files/rupasulibarawufaxowuke.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7749/3146/files/6081534161.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9019/8180/files/14076292106.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5575/9011/files/65302718809.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4832/1692/files/mulinitonilur.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3187/2166/files/49366320659.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0282/8699/files/pdf_viewer_for_google_drive.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3949/7112/files/vitilukazube.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
font_00_sfnt_off00007106.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7106 | 5372 bytes |
SHA-256: a924614cca124536c4121adec7cca9df3df26518993914bc506bb91ee41c4811 |
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font_01_sfnt_off00008340.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8340 | 15068 bytes |
SHA-256: e0d0ad8e1f7e9bb25002cc317b18014e93c612d502a86bedb785b9a123bfa891 |
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