Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3995eb7d2d383a9f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.1 KB Created: 2021-06-09 20:54:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-27
MD5: a36dcd30363e78c1d33ebf63aa21becd SHA-1: 8beff7e7bea9d7bdf62ab3c506192e8bf39550af SHA-256: 3995eb7d2d383a9f19e9ce3a58363f1cd9c651393584fd60a15d321ecaa36fa8
214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics as malicious, including a critical ClamAV detection and an ML classifier. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing attempt. The presence of 'utm_term' parameters indicates an attempt to track user engagement with these links, likely leading to further malicious content or phishing pages.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gimoguvi.ru/123?utm_term=everfi+financial+literacy+module+6+answers PDF link annotation
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4482631/normal_5fe40707ed8f1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kixisulik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740480/7410498.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://raponomipa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681826/9909492.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://foxewazijibaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379544/403266.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kawowubizi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134864460/2149205.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://salosewevina.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/7/5/137513487/90b325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415331/normal_601f0f5d3452b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wigubidukes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606651/610ac59fffaf07e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://berigagagek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384675/lesiletid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baxorejo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/2/135295822/gileziv_dumitegemakep_lasokizax_teviwiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gijedilegin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380969/573977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://liguroxuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134443360/9279477.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jovawovifo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134883275/duwowosagegaji-radamumunuguzi-wowevubuj-sosanij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pebabozepevi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135966679/nixogezosubov_wekojov_vajewojebuvav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nurituxokel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134849265/bakiduwidasobopo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tusilagel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739454/bobexawumaxibu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fefodenajefive.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437461/gedirivaxukasizisiku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vigegenatiborig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740049/525924.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://varukixenusenat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134700479/8678511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziripovamenof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134647136/d88447.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ffda.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFFDA 5532 bytes
SHA-256: 4d56de3052bd08b45912462ef770ce81dc773b52bfaecfaa7b5c81ea500acf45
font_01_sfnt_off000112b6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x112B6 11440 bytes
SHA-256: 403b4db8352168fb1a8241e1ebb601d1d722d19237add9bb16a8e682b3227a10