Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 395e3f0cd392c7d5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.1 KB Created: 2020-08-19 21:32:01 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 59f26b276164c05eeb332cbb4d43c003 SHA-1: 07a2e9908da17d27a3357c6f5218116ab45f9c0c SHA-256: 395e3f0cd392c7d581bafac27bf607a81bdf62059150f17db43753b09a742328
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link, specifically pointing to 'https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=ganesh+permission+form+online+cyberabad+police'. This URL is presented within the document body, disguised as a legitimate form. The file also contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to Shopify domains, suggesting a link farm or distribution mechanism. No scripts were extracted, and the document body is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of the malicious redirector is a strong indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=ganesh+permission+form+online+cyberabad+police
    • http://files.clearpropertyservice.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383607/wimaguwezowuxaworube.pdf
    • http://files.chrishenkaline.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607703/jafubadifugolepubo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2834/9085/files/81880922773.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7052/9436/files/gukupow.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/96989945255.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7379/8306/files/lazeravuga.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0390/3127/files/gasirafojumuxig.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/1479/7981/files/68757441043.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0074/1531/files/83730827928.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9362/2935/files/tuvamifuguzuxu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5680/8615/files/ziwikofuzagunuteruwil.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5369/5647/files/69119518182.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7332/2664/files/xiletetopefaw.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000426c.bin
e94a77793d905af180758eeaf5017b93ad24154938665adcff2d51708406c8ba		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x426C 5668 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000558a.bin
042f665142cadb9abd3db5e125eedd7955e8c45398efe55ab09e3b18ade40d47		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x558A 9564 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000767e.bin
03928253ee2cb1fef248e02a9a6434000674c6c2dfc7f61f5290e699cd36adc1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x767E 16088 bytes

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