Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3917f8bb6032e0bf…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

229.0 KB
MD5: 1da800c8650d9f532a52a4181cf860fa SHA-1: fa8e14dde3645ef59b58cc2368f2c100546ba6fe SHA-256: 3917f8bb6032e0bf4495305ffa20cb036c6792dd9054c62ba5e541663c1a8f8c
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document utilizing the default 'VelvetSweatshop' password to bypass static analysis. It contains a embedded OLE object in 'xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin' that triggers CVE-2018-0798, a vulnerability in the Microsoft Equation Editor. The high entropy and malformed native stream (OLE10NaTIVe) in the embedded object indicate the presence of a shellcode payload intended for execution upon opening the document.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.