Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 38fd5a643cd329cf…

MALICIOUS

RTF

74.4 KB First seen: 2023-08-08
MD5: 36ad1ecd6b0f7db0870eee41a3ea5840 SHA-1: dd01a78ff1fed202da9d0477d3dca2d93d624904 SHA-256: 38fd5a643cd329cff4a7304970bbc9493e0df309bee2fdd5d11c42ceef27a7c1
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common technique to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003cd0.bin
70eb973b1fc187d21d9bc20ec5614cd393be481079759620fd8a4025c8dbe0f4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3CD0 1935 bytes