Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 38b4ea9fc8eed83b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.7 KB
MD5: 9a7936d813baf4b43d99f2957bc2f6c3 SHA-1: 52f1b4d69ceb234659a8c80aaf4fdd0092d76167 SHA-256: 38b4ea9fc8eed83b10dca8ee176e457ebf1016a8fd048af4692fc87282360b8b
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked objects that are forced to update. This technique is commonly used to bypass macro security settings and execute embedded malicious content. The presence of 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further indicates a user-enablement lure to trigger the malicious behavior. No specific family could be identified, and no scripts or URLs were extracted for further IOCs.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
5ab17f10c86ca1fa2359b2c92b63805f313ecb7d10c9bc8b7cf62099d00de8e7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19836 bytes
objdata_01_off0000ab30.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB30 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c0d3.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0D3 12297 bytes