Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3881fde84ee52f54…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: d1c98ea057c680835a90502a44a34c69 SHA-1: d6ba69ac63720accf9672e862cdd174b0f907911 SHA-256: 3881fde84ee52f54e0cecd859c0623beaa728d4d7c3fef1c0dd784b40c9184f7
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate further indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This points to a classic exploit delivery mechanism targeting a known vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000085.bin
1efd214fda4c9eb03bda4d41c1187b5348b705602bccecc536a0ced161c580ba
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x85 1746 bytes