Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3874c48c17a2bc28…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

235.0 KB Created: 2020-11-25 13:22:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 87ea0162ca77ad052ce66fb801f9b053 SHA-1: 1d7ac0c025da51b424c884173b39989537e413e0 SHA-256: 3874c48c17a2bc2865506896e4d900d73fe51928fbb588faa6225456680d6f81
268 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening, indicated by the 'Document_Open' and 'OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC' heuristics. This macro likely uses 'GetObject' and references Windows Script Host to download and execute a second-stage payload from one of the embedded unknown-reputation URLs. The presence of a NOP sled further suggests shellcode execution.

Heuristics 9

  • NOP sled detected high SC_NOP_SLED
    Found 20+ consecutive 0x90 bytes
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://retcon.iworkshop.hu/vendor/laravel-filemanager/images/test-folder/Lht96Am8I8.php
    • https://portal.provisiongroup.com.au/js/soon/56fJTN1EGoy9s2K.php
    • https://buy.manairge.com/img/news/video/yoKHoSxL8p1.php
    • http://evahollmann.de.phees.de/test/content/40.Galerien/05.im-reich-des-fauns/LvQH4dpq1.php
    • http://dev.dyfedsuperfast.co.uk/wp-content/HQVo9WBUrDK.php
    • https://sms.solasystems.net/sms/img/website/fancybox_img/56Zf7fUC04Y7.php
    • http://mail.interactio.ch/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/NwTMPECUxRhF.php
    • https://sistema.eseicanea.com.ar/usr/share/nginx/www/6wGMMgNVH.php
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c09823134256d7c829ff2709d7b12fccb6e9cbe21851db8e2d636074cbb28f78		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 32000 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 125 Chr/ChrW string-construction calls. Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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