Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 384530aa2adf0778…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.4 KB Created: 2021-06-30 09:49:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: b93fe2b5a0864f74538638028b01ceb4 SHA-1: c2ad78d85c6e6e710e763393c825657612087a45 SHA-256: 384530aa2adf077875109967ce63dec9a9709d0bb7d7d98947f95bc633f9a1a7
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF file is classified as malicious by ML models and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of threat. The document contains numerous links to external PDFs hosted on compromised WordPress sites and disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malware. The 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristic indicates the document attempts social engineering by instructing the user to execute commands, likely to bypass security measures and download a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://a-kamen.com/userfiles/file/raxijirowudekinezapobi.pdf
    • https://abril.pe/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/va2ua241rah91m09fhs31nitg4/28363433710.pdf
    • http://sosonomo.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/25696164497.pdf
    • http://discoveryenglish.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bfdec3e9d43---64130684225.pdf
    • http://mirrorgallery.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609b00d80cf2d---87251548431.pdf
    • http://pavcargo.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/64d6c303cbf28a03a8f04a7ef93c76a9/94599776585.pdf
    • https://vaytieudungtragop.com.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1ntvk9vjf62hel453rmofrbfof/vixekibale.pdf
    • https://pluckywize.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8625f3e515---25530964522.pdf
    • http://lukoilmarine.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/18856470529.pdf
    • http://bayernglobal.de/userVZ//file/xirebivigipumepemag.pdf
    • http://bmsorganica.com/userfiles/file/81431484085.pdf
    • http://myshopgroup.com/userfiles/files/93950255575.pdf
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7260d94f8b---megibuz.pdf
    • http://conservationenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aaa735eb371---86944284398.pdf
    • http://doublehappyvstheinfinitesadness.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073fcab36dcd---kokepufisofutisunuv.pdf
    • https://hopefor.today/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cf7e3569d0b8248ab6f4e1e682530958/xokabexawewujigodam.pdf
    • http://yesilderecine.com/admin/editor_resim/file/kezijutib.pdf
    • http://pericosrentcar.com.mx/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ada7ac893e3---bevinokedumex.pdf
    • https://ev-owners.jp/userfiles//files/54064588885.pdf
    • https://www.inkfactory.pk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606fd859d81a2---12346218901.pdf
    • http://www.hangmandigital.com/files/file/bidegotu.pdf
    • http://principessavencanice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b6be3e0db3---65991133060.pdf
    • https://amenajarisiconstructii.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b57f2377ed---nunit.pdf
    • https://aronabritcan.com/userfiles/file/65310001982.pdf
    • http://adria-ex.com/images/blog//file/mizifimasoxomef.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/1xuhb7AK25c/uplcv?utm_term=windows+8.1+product+key+activator+download
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e4ce.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE4CE 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fce5.bin
61b0a0ef0fde6918df0e875ad32405aa190745634344b05f3fb35f44938e52b2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCE5 11284 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000117aa.bin
aa0d46030be1725aea53f3be0642769b166934f57e12895169dff92431531170
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x117AA 16996 bytes