Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 38358f53fa88d25e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.3 KB Created: 2021-06-29 23:55:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 6cc6ef2ca68a41f22cabe9a9d1d67460 SHA-1: f44894391048e143238a3f3e8f0d1785ded35337 SHA-256: 38358f53fa88d25ea358515e57d5fbb8d9a7588f32e04903c7b1596632c959ab
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a callback phishing or tech-support scam, as indicated by the 'SE_CALLBACK_LURE' heuristic. It contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS upload directories, suggesting a link farm designed to host malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or trojan delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9932

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://beribuket.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0a8a4ba037e0c18a676f16cf5b3cca30/mozobanazupal.pdf
    • http://a-range.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac0ff87f07e---kuxisujefomukasijuga.pdf
    • https://higher-reason.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ooe6vv58dfg04dl8kq5kr5q3tr/poluzutosifetezijogixegab.pdf
    • https://pankalconstructora.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16092af1ac6e32---lorirubasebobakujot.pdf
    • https://rebates.forex/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6b3qhj654e4ni1vbsk1smrm5c1/voxokopetawugazozizove.pdf
    • https://northstarexecutivesearch.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/52c518f2dfc263ed5e930f76a36b2525/42815972001.pdf
    • http://interface-referencement.com/userfiles/file/77560414188.pdf
    • https://simovi.mx/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16087034866f3b---82703495272.pdf
    • http://msslink.ru/userfiles/files/nubitadiwe.pdf
    • https://brokenspoke.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2be9e3be2b07e7b10baac10c6f1193f8/28145863137.pdf
    • http://boathousebrokerage.com/userfiles/file/xejusosomojivakuwe.pdf
    • https://lcd96.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4e448a70afb0196e6373255535384c45/22503929993.pdf
    • https://aimara-bg.com/userfiles/file/jarewu.pdf
    • https://seroinstitute.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8dfecd00fab4e454bfd7babfe44a1cc1/kowudixeweredoremimupoliw.pdf
    • https://alismobile.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7334971b4206d53053520a374dd4ddcb/zudagowibe.pdf
    • http://www.holderit.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608098c765f6c---13116717819.pdf
    • http://frangarcia.eu/upload/file/72630649539.pdf
    • https://prosegik.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a69ee6bdde71647a8a79516c8a8d1a3d/25815845052.pdf
    • http://hytechplus.com/userfiles/file/28570725438.pdf
    • http://ozanatalan.com/iboard/includes/userfiles/files/kifurubetajosuwisigupiba.pdf
    • https://skyfireconsulting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/boc37phifbsse7fpoci33r37d5/88463121901.pdf
    • https://soudurelausiere.ca/upload/editor/file/28952372941.pdf
    • https://www.hauptsache.cc/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b9744fa8e5a---99813180314.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=flvs+french+1+answers
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e96f.bin
076e8fed160ad455a76a16d7b62d8e6f8bf360fb0b9cdbb79ede915ae50fecb8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE96F 10304 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000100ac.bin
0621abc69af913e8324858fb3e8556c8cdf71fc9cc3ad45f3f763951639d41ca		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100AC 17424 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012d9d.bin
47701b8b47c77a0cf28aefe4b4308fedd425eff3654fefb6465933fee19e5195		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12D9D 16288 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00014366.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14366 16792 bytes

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