Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 38308b30b94e9f64…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

166.9 KB Created: 2006-01-25 08:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 9527149920f820d7569980d3f606244c SHA-1: 3c0b38aeab1a89535426c7415d1312d217b12d3f SHA-256: 38308b30b94e9f6467410fc21d4140beb54c4c9811fe02d9538f430f0e0d30ba
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristic firings related to process creation (CreateProcess), shell execution (ShellExecute), memory allocation (VirtualAlloc), and dynamic library loading (LoadLibrary, GetProcAddress). These indicators suggest the document is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The OLE slack anomaly further points to potential obfuscation or embedded malicious content. Without a document body or script content, the specific lure and payload delivery mechanism remain unclear, leading to an 'unknown family' classification.

Heuristics 6

  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 170,912 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,151 bytes — 149,761 bytes (88%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API