Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 38091e69cb40c86c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.6 KB Created: 2020-09-06 11:36:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 90c94f64bd588e453d47c4acc9580de2 SHA-1: 4be2eef99f3521941dff75c6939b257d110c1a40 SHA-256: 38091e69cb40c86c19f2828183ad4770983730435d0422ef2f51d32a9c0bc4ac
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a link to a known malicious redirector, ttraff.link, which is likely used to funnel victims to further malicious content. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same URL and references to 'south africa traditional music free', suggesting a lure. The presence of numerous external PDF links, many pointing to static.usrfiles.com, indicates a link farm strategy, likely to improve SEO for malicious content or to obscure the final destination.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/wix?keyword=south+africa+traditional+music+free
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/02631b_3f308ed1a07940c5884ef679c5f76bb2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/07e02c_09dd1da923774b879584cbbe0c080122.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/665c20_895eb074caed4b37ba4dea311410335e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/50988c_764c961e87004d17ad452d34a2844096.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0481/3721/files/33417904175.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/debbe1_cf25700b755946678e2a122672ccd4ce.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a421e3_1c332d804b9a4423b1dfa45e17c1cb7e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/fd30ac_f120c11d7ae447c0a2569f93fe164c3a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b42fd6_3419a68409d84738ba29b2d9f0cae93b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ab0441_9148b84fcbc443eeaa1b71eedea7016c.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6241/1942/files/xolekures.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6915/3181/files/orange_county_california_school_calendar_2018-19.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0457/3672/2588/files/google_chrome_for_windows_10_exe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7458/3702/files/communications_plan_template_powerpoint.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c14.bin
32a38089da30b165927510f0daad8e9cbad5db427a4965fe7e8961dde1f7241c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C14 5248 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007dae.bin
4f14330802d81a938395ac4ede5cb0d46d9ee0d7ce6ce1c3911417e117b39dba		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7DAE 9896 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00009f8c.bin
0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F8C 4324 bytes

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