Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 37fd0bb4b05853e3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

106.7 KB Created: 2021-07-15 14:37:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 57df4042c453cb58c2e9def535f97f99 SHA-1: a8579f3ec92aceb61925d5b4229554cc075d33bf SHA-256: 37fd0bb4b05853e381e85861d2f27e31ef75a87051132f0fc37faf6d636b83cc
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and a machine learning classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The heuristics reveal it impersonates DHL for credential phishing and utilizes a link farm hosted on compromised WordPress sites and disposable domains. Although no scripts were extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest it is designed to lure users into clicking malicious links, likely leading to credential theft or further exploitation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9958

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=driver%27s+license+meaning.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://vce34.ru/attachments/file/34012242360.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarsurdurulebilir.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/v8a0pudsq6kfnq5gagf113s7g2/daxodavodulefevabuvivuko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sellos-mecanicos.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4334217acb189a7457b8e899437d38e7/89925318039.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.radiopopiatej.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b7bf9f488e0---mozatapefekozamakubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsinusectomi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d19aa20812---64588096332.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://boracayg.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210705_4D5CDD27EB6AC813.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://associacaoguainumbi.org.br/wp/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160768f1334af2---46837689835.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://julieesteban.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cb236de6e8---tutabuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://enville.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ce385970b6---83528243796.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bjallstar.com/upload/file/bamemomorutevil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://a-range.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b5c2ab88be---44650459740.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tentauto23.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/61247601445.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://protech.com.ng/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d965b97601---97218230861.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mrmobilewebsite.agency/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/15fa9444fcc61c1427457a074789a86b/43163608200.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://namastehealth.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vor42s4mkdpqobne3f9364vosu/98508715343.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.potterycommercials.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160999cfad68cc---xuwuvenuwinutudaluxefep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://phunggia.biz/userfiles/file/27455216561.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://prime-standard.com/piceditor/file/lomojezum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pass-eco-energies.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/mizarutujegij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ithaca1962.com/clients/41687/File/69921334092.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wooshin.kr/uploaded/file/118804976060e4e951b35c7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ntiverification.com/userfiles/file/20465542155.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cga82.com/admin/File/rojetulupodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=driver%27s+license+meaningPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00014174.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14174 17132 bytes
SHA-256: 0a275bedfa33e3fdf4e32dac6156177b17b0ee1b00fa2e64ec0b7763c4ec2de4
font_01_sfnt_off00016de7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16DE7 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000185fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x185FE 10456 bytes
SHA-256: 2d87055594538f20f02f2cea71d011c045988b57749fdcbe1ae84660cc67ed94

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