Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 37f95d8178a57e89…

MALICIOUS

RTF

97.3 KB First seen: 2024-08-27
MD5: 97184c45a919e70afa3378753cae6e2f SHA-1: f4c79776bc1118e884270b11d3f0680d752fe4f1 SHA-256: 37f95d8178a57e896632facd8387f1318dc37388159052e0e428b94bb5b0089c
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a second-stage payload. The heuristics strongly suggest exploitation of CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability used for initial access.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b0c.bin
abde2801756bf432e976bc4993491ea2629db2337e054c86757a277e1af64eab
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B0C 1997 bytes