Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 37a30787441a0dee…

MALICIOUS

PDF

98.8 KB Created: 2021-06-29 16:55:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 3b16312eff3e2176d58756f446566b4c SHA-1: 59ff97f2bb6f330169f3189949deef92a3e2b0b8 SHA-256: 37a30787441a0dee66279493e333f566470c8744b7f53d7c18c4ad6cee29b95f
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF document that contains numerous links to external websites, many of which appear to be compromised or disposable hosting. The 'SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE' heuristic strongly suggests the document's purpose is to trick users into believing there are changes to payment instructions, a common tactic in business email compromise attacks. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of PDF-specific exploits and the ML classifier's high confidence indicate malicious intent, likely involving the exploitation of PDF vulnerabilities to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9936

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://alrabbancapital.com/file/files/vekep.pdf
    • http://anadarkogomezfamily.com/clients/7/76/76920377ef4e0cfe2c6e77079a05cbd4/File/1925909124.pdf
    • http://thegroverestaurantnj.com/userfiles/files/52498214506.pdf
    • https://www.kngroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f90e2ab663---nuxazalukizezotuputof.pdf
    • https://www.darrellstuckey.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160718142cdfd6---ranupovile.pdf
    • http://pc75.net/upfiles/file/1621187621.pdf
    • https://www.onestopnaturalstore.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/k50pq15r16gc3k7kt0aap4gvqv/vijiwenadovufeguxilezem.pdf
    • https://alakharia.com/public_html/userfiles/file/lupixiv.pdf
    • https://yarsan.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e96a1d695668e1d5e9e4aea8cbf23da6/bipobijele.pdf
    • https://mygo.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/16171875814.pdf
    • https://dezsredstvompx.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/98de9c1cccf0ad83a46b3c14eac8fc1b/mikokawabovinulanoboba.pdf
    • https://anmimar.com/royal/userfiles/file/38905577483.pdf
    • https://seataclightingalaska.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/832a24a375c408f99553037936fbdbc5/65994844331.pdf
    • https://www.formwork.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cbvrepv0hv1ipgjnmkauvrhsce/bakiseraxoxaminerij.pdf
    • https://amirep.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/132d86a7000a97c737748e950fcc93ba/zoduda.pdf
    • https://suemsas.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/va6uu1p6f5v215dcq4ieo4kf30/faxudidak.pdf
    • https://brylka-kfz.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083260703d1a---43295826738.pdf
    • http://55thocscompany.com/clients/62662/File/66753716455.pdf
    • https://www.chortho.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/v5r1uh8l855b4ac2fjeibkg3ja/83526292175.pdf
    • http://bukharasuwanee.com/sites/default/files/file/81650573998.pdf
    • https://www.parkgest.ch/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079abfe7871a---maresep.pdf
    • http://www.gainerwindows.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/43i5l5ic43j1a59n7nki1kmoq6/vojetuxi.pdf
    • https://acryl-bg.com/userfiles/file/31179506434.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=guerilla+marketing+meaning
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011fd2.bin
10125e6eb75ec737246bee4c834d647c3147dbd4b602856d0c644e9925ca2c38
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11FD2 10396 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001374c.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1374C 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00014f5e.bin
2cab7e49ed43ef653652e7e90caa97f13a45a592de4403b21695f59ec5983b62
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14F5E 17456 bytes