RTF malware analysis — malicious · 379b7a7813c5203c

MALICIOUS

RTF

6.1 KB First seen: 2019-01-12

MD5: 8109fefd369fdfb054f58aae9ebbfb34 SHA-1: d79e9f8bdd660778724c8164f53ecc7c4315b949 SHA-256: 379b7a7813c5203c1928cebd533898572c35043cff1ad735fc09ca51ee333082

162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains OLE object data that is automatically linked and updated, triggering CVE-2017-0199 or CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for the loading of a remote payload via the OLE moniker stream, indicating the file's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage malicious artifact. The specific vulnerabilities exploited are identified as high-priority indicators.

Heuristics 5

CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER

RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000200.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x200	2668 bytes
SHA-256: `e130debc20eee568eaf15205dd3ea12adabb065639d1f212c244d6c704ac6e4e`

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