Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 378835a1c7082458…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.4 KB Created: 2021-05-27 18:10:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 883d266922a643cee6b1c4b50963d3a1 SHA-1: 02e1d4b9df37333112b11003161b0d3a1c5d63c6 SHA-256: 378835a1c70824588666c12792c9ee46917bda905ed7342ada41b18e3673daeb
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress installations or disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware delivery. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself facilitates the attack by embedding these deceptive links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://woonhuislift.info/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075d69f3ecc4---25735912095.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://m-co.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3u6nid9l855glf18p2vdh15oaa/80571339503.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mirrorgallery.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac03457d51e---jixekabewi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskyroyalshakespeareglobetheatrelondon.com/clientMedia/file/45579433755.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rusiuojigalvoji.lt/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7154724518---zapekezabimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://srp-galabau-rostock.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/unvbv5r62239monq8hue4pkn2j/dujavevopokovuganipa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bokseinstituttet.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070fa4e73b2f---dalegat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072c4a4a7e84---6643783908.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.justgym.co.za/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vueajevpfm5pg2pml6qou26tns/76871168236.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.pointcookelectrician.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070150d2d361---58673789032.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amkboiler.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/p8jl23vdonjheqidng15k12nuk/jadusowejax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aedwea.com/upload/foto/91425376445.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://funkydrop.shop/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5be4009e4f07fc0db41eea12ca11b4cf/kojawamifevuxibozalepuro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://emergent-partners.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ebfcecfcb0---33308987699.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/cv9VXjIrmdE/uplcv?utm_term=schritte+a1+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d816.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD816 5188 bytes
SHA-256: 8c1df39d19b9762208b254d0ff6def3c44c44d71ddb2d785b9ce5ce2252cdb80
font_01_sfnt_off0000e9be.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE9BE 11968 bytes
SHA-256: 805bb5fdac67a7b80abccb847b666b4adfc92cbb812a6c4c884005d776808fd2

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