Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 37882e91f5a24eef…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.3 KB Created: 2020-10-27 21:52:33 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 10d16d86854d35a2ede15d080a8c14b0 SHA-1: 3abede68f59c4e315cb3df1bf0d809a5d940e1c9 SHA-256: 37882e91f5a24eef0478b4ea3cb861bf0c8c3d83719c9250f431b219916a368a
164 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The PDF document contains a lure for a 'Google doc checkbox list' and embeds multiple URLs, some of which point to known malicious redirectors. The 'SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE' heuristic indicates the document's intent is to trick the user into installing a fake browser extension or update, a common method for malware delivery. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/123?keyword=google+doc+checkbox+list In PDF document text
    • https://togitarusufojir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681229/sogovukanu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wunamixexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134456109/faxisija_nabom_begedi_tibopixedivo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fulipevaxavu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695351/riladiwowogitug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xogexemufak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437987/digolekuweguvor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fodezamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407453/xisonitupidez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pepuzategazeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453576/dikepukol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suganolorifumu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814011/b31bc455.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376099/normal_5f951e7be9d12.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379837/normal_5f8b1847443bd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384817/normal_5f98536ab2829.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/31d42a4a-4a91-46e2-9861-edafe92f6fbc/bexavaneziket.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8377125b-94ca-4c09-b1cc-0c7eef43d901/probleme_relevage_tracteur_someca.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tetazino/adobe_reader_for_windows_10_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pazovugal/13680103270.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bezegoluzose/cambridge_history_of_african_american_literature.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6ebf9a4a-8041-4fa1-99c4-e6739f140fad/98543195014.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d9032aea-2012-45fe-8196-7425c212a9bc/26005185989.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000642e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x642E 5196 bytes
SHA-256: 27f0650b73480505bacd8b363db5c3cecf8bba815310394d0b84a3222c1ad0f1
font_01_sfnt_off000075dc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75DC 10220 bytes
SHA-256: aa07630d1758d6126b7c6a4af616cf12bd94824d837e962e7e186c3543ef9a6b

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.