MALICIOUS
482
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
The sample is a Microsoft Word document containing an embedded PE executable and an Ole10Native package designed to drop an auto-executable payload. Heuristics indicate references to WinExec, CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, suggesting the execution of a secondary payload. The embedded executable and the Ole10Native package are the primary indicators of malicious intent, likely facilitating the execution of malware.
Heuristics 11
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CVE-2007-3899 — Microsoft Word malformed string memory corruption critical CVE likely CVE_2007_3899Word OLE document has the MS07-060 malformed-string exploit shape: a Word 97-family FIB points to a malformed DOP/string-table region with an abnormal INT_MAX run, inflated text counters, and exploit payload or Mdropper.Z campaign evidence.
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Legacy Flash object embedded in Office document high OFFICE_LEGACY_SWF_OBJECTOffice document embeds a ShockwaveFlash ActiveX object with a legacy SWF version (5). This is old Flash-in-Office exploit-family evidence, not a specific Flash CVE without SWF tag-level validation.
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OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
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Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXEMZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
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Embedded Adobe Flash (SWF) in OLE document critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_SWFDocument contains an embedded Adobe Flash (SWF) object. Vulnerabilities such as CVE-2018-4878 and CVE-2018-15982 involved Flash objects embedded in Office files. Adobe Flash has been end-of-life since December 2020.
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Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILEOLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
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Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXECReference to WinExec API
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Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESSReference to CreateProcess API
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
embedded_office_00003a68.exe |
embedded-pe | Office MZ+PE at offset 0x3A68 | 436120 bytes |
SHA-256: e2b4e8a53a7a585a611ea69c6003c9e9b1266b7ce193b4fdfd5459a9bbd85ea0 |
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ole10native_00.bin |
ole-package | OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1129443725/Ole10Native | 426520 bytes |
SHA-256: 747b1729f06b7f48857273ee91968725060c7a38c7be24bd80fcd420a501a9a1 |
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