Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 37667c865018adeb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.1 KB Created: 2020-11-09 13:11:51 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: 2e3f059ea1cfa46c48f7ef0bb71afb57 SHA-1: a296b76b19a0476bdbac0b0f4022bdac01ac9c40 SHA-256: 37667c865018adeb15af92daeca501a92def14779026cba187a98d7158772d62
214 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) or Microsoft license-boilerplate documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/123?keyword=dmv+clarksville+tn+change+of+address In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4393763/normal_5f93ee8b61faa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duzetokip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134404829/lelofefuwis-furutetirewud-velasunatigolot-kitegoxalis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369786/normal_5f8bf31a71c9a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4410722/normal_5fa30b2924871.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4386594/normal_5fa40fe5ae3d1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4392199/normal_5fa39f716e429.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372682/normal_5f8a303d37f8d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xowilululevala.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017879/sedelomebib_bofexepigi_gimawem_wivugapidobatoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimelasu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134513778/tobuzopujufefanorik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366022/normal_5f87198a452ae.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bidivo/wofazefifu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/figugipopar/vuwiluzaxenator.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tokafanawa/pazerana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f89.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F89 5348 bytes
SHA-256: f67293cfc134c7bf8bf8376be9c32070cc87562993e0efd2a28b57c8741fc865
font_01_sfnt_off0000718f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x718F 10532 bytes
SHA-256: 505fb5ad6263262999dcf5f162b5ae529ce33852851e3b84e5f2a1a48c417084
font_02_sfnt_off00009588.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9588 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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