MALICIOUS
116
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.002 Malicious Link
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1071.001 Web Protocols
The PDF is encrypted and contains JavaScript, indicating an attempt to hide malicious content and evade static analysis. The presence of a UNC path (`\\192.168.1.1\share\test.txt`) suggests an attempt at NTLM credential theft, potentially related to CVE-2018-4993. The document is also identified as an image-only lure, typical of phishing campaigns designed to trick users into interacting with malicious content.
Heuristics 5
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UNC path in PDF — possible NTLM credential theft (CVE-2018-4993/CVE-2019-7089) high CVE likely CVE_2018_4993PDF contains a UNC path (\\server\share) alongside action triggers — when a vulnerable viewer resolves this path, Windows may send NTLM credentials to the remote host as the matching PDF action is processed
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Encrypted PDF carries /OpenAction — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JSPDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/OpenAction). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
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Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LUREPDF has 2 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 28 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Extracted artifacts 10
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0017_000.jsa101776aad7b096df7ad1bd6d4c62666d1165e0f69a4fc53f232f9fe6aad9efa |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0x1252 | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0018_001.js6b3028acdd9af96239847bb6f1c62c224fc45ea284714ed33cb18f191ff89a16 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 18 at offset 0x142D | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0019_002.js4e0c2e7f140172a44410b3c94bd6f452bdf829b05570d36b09811e453257fd19 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 19 at offset 0x15FB | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0020_003.js77b8753d08bf39db5e3a8856997447590b16a12bac5a310b93359646f8909b81 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 20 at offset 0x17E5 | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0021_004.js95d6eaeb643aeee61089670c01f0e7e9efd80d7019b09928c24aeec19952f90b |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 21 at offset 0x19AC | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0022_005.js114f589d32c686a1bde7caf9d985beaf4561e5762b6dcce07f0f6d7a4a6c7497 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x1B89 | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0023_006.js2259050e2d955f7d42692b7c3ef24128c3e9f1922a432542379b072120709254 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 23 at offset 0x1D4B | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0024_007.js8a2384cbdeb484c026f001af9c4e6a17379ce92db6071413145778b31c39e5bf |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 24 at offset 0x1F21 | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0025_008.js9512fa81f7c5a4d291679fdd327a5c8178a303b665e7c22e89000cc83cf915fe |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 25 at offset 0x20F1 | 85 bytes |
javascript_obj0026_009.jsda7e89f32800bba5ed8624bcf806462c4782dc1fa966a7c7fc09f7c051886879 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 26 at offset 0x22C0 | 85 bytes |
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