Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 37486839825aed2a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.4 KB
MD5: 03da684bf306a00cd7f6c0c05163e637 SHA-1: a6f1496b32abbe5381ab0b7de878b05940772d9b SHA-256: 37486839825aed2abc83ab8a88e84db74487d2c2987bc54f23b5f0ddcc5229dd
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of \objupdate and \objdata sections indicates an attempt to automatically activate and execute embedded content, likely a malicious payload. This points to an exploit targeting the Equation Editor component within Microsoft Office.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b9.bin
2dc354e8a3cbfa990f80ffbfbbc3051e70292dfe67b6b7cacbfd4837b7b2f151
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB9 2006 bytes