Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 373b5f7ef740b168

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.73 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: 38f49cebd1e99d07097cc3f38d6f7237 SHA-1: c8dcfa4f67c83fd5690e467c629848a79e7855d7 SHA-256: 373b5f7ef740b1680a98cb1c347d7afbc049ecc4515cc241e62ab869c9d21e17

132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious File: Malicious Link

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object to download and execute a remote payload from the URL 'https://kannn.me/CpDEzm?&ｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏ'. It also contains an embedded PDF with suspicious findings, including a URI to 'https://www.eventmediaservice.ch/droits-politiques/'. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.

URL https://kannn.me/CpDEzm?&ｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏｏ
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
External URI info PDF_URI

PDF contains an external URL action

URL https://www.eventmediaservice.ch/droits-politiques/
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00001400.pdf` `baa932316297b364bdde1d8992bbf43cbcc4548a06e428936992b339af41b820`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1400	1804800 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00037a00.pdf` `c7bd93e174737bc50daadc49d16d84a73ada363b75c732ebfb9a72fad1c34f60`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x37A00	1582080 bytes

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