Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 36fa258cc0f1aa08…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.5 KB Created: 2021-07-04 03:24:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 87bafbbaf527e30af69342d28aa4513e SHA-1: e0938dcc0b01f60efce9672571fe3ef8b0f9f6d9 SHA-256: 36fa258cc0f1aa08eb4a479507c1dc75433395b5835a75d3ead3de7a3baa6d8f
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The document employs a social-engineering lure, specifically a 'browser install lure', to trick users into downloading and installing what is likely a malicious browser extension or plugin. Several URLs were extracted, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a pattern of hosting malicious content on potentially compromised infrastructure. The presence of external URIs and link farms further supports the malicious nature of the document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9947

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wastran.ru/uplcv?utm_term=download+projector+driver+for+windows+10
    • https://www.potterycommercials.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160853324a5857---xozomadifuzijukokibase.pdf
    • http://smartcookieacademy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c3c7b310fa---votujutipakozop.pdf
    • http://aclamerica.com/customers/CMS-IMAGES/file/letafabovafeninuleru.pdf
    • https://joefairless.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dd7fbb09d7b6908caa59b6ad768040fc/tesiluzadujomefor.pdf
    • https://fajanav.com/aym_image/files/31386790764.pdf
    • http://parkhighclassof60.com/clients/871169/File/jenasobaruvojowuzutokanor.pdf
    • http://westboroughhigh76.com/clients/b/bc/bc4984db1d461a603911d7e4814e3e59/File/lijefova.pdf
    • http://vietxetai.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/q92jbdn71mis2k8ocmkss83sc4/47354005769.pdf
    • https://flvirginia.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/024509474b62037b15faa3346992918a/71419752471.pdf
    • https://davebakeragency.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/75dd1f72e3dc9a63593644ca039eb9bc/kikob.pdf
    • https://selectwifi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609730dea897f---vazowapurexiwa.pdf
    • https://specialbrands.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ea90b3b5f71a676b89f011d8ba56a939/94265959269.pdf
    • http://matrixuniverzum.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607822d74ee18---vanovuwu.pdf
    • http://gayaarchi.com/userfiles/file/20210623223308.pdf
    • http://apricomm.com/userData/board/file/263805448.pdf
    • http://sys-svinding.dk/userfiles/file/ribaduxig.pdf
    • https://www.formwork.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ppv1j1tcg6cqn8269aou76ul1f/sodaduwodejo.pdf
    • https://www.infrascale.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/73b35d77444ef73411caddf144d55fb0/jopasat.pdf
    • http://accessprecision.com/userfiles/file/guvadowatadedeku.pdf
    • http://www.insurancedirectcanada.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094d06b1d93d---togivaxupejopolop.pdf
    • http://xn--90aoj0agf7cq.xn--p1ai/uploads/files/zotekeger.pdf
    • http://rauvuonsach.com/images/uploads/files/19493144763.pdf
    • https://www.synergyheart2heart.team/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rc36o34b23ek5ggd52atuovpat/sipirus.pdf
    • http://xedaptap.net/userfiles/file/sonuwomonepavude.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f5bb.bin
a2932b38ec5eebd170ca7fd0f31212541d650897cc49271baaec42a01d64d14a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5BB 17756 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000124a9.bin
56fe9494bc7025b36cecece21647a90a24888b1fd98b24d7ebea8d6519a9f5ee		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x124A9 11068 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013ea2.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13EA2 16792 bytes

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