Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 36f4eefd61633819…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.1 KB Created: 2021-09-03 17:57:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: e6797e884114f6cb30df0686c9c44cfb SHA-1: d3bed3ee63f4309a5bac9bb36cdf535f118323a3 SHA-256: 36f4eefd6163381920241ee04e2bd250a99e839daa401c0853e142944c8670d0
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF contains an embedded JavaScript stream and numerous links to external URLs, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress sites or disposable domains. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to trick users into downloading a second-stage payload. The embedded JavaScript is a common technique for executing malicious code within PDFs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9978

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/uplcv?utm_term=ielts+speaking+questions+and+answers+part+1+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://www.thaiboat.net/image/upload/File/ramunonodapopuzusikix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feriaesotericadeatocha.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160823fe4a20db---53575044772.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mgogs.com/mgfiles/file/16822316913.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://topopentertainment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609582f90f535---xaponezoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hotspot-usa.com/js/upload/files/56189850601.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dambi.pl/userfiles/file/zegigepexutinoranev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.citysecurity.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/s2frpl2tgitktppa7nldeun4h1/43910640365.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.associatedomains.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160872a1a04d6a---82282064147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://syteq-pro.com/userfiles/file/77768604819.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ithaca1962.com/clients/41687/File/31419288524.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://psystat.net/candyticket/uploads/page_images/files/vagidubowekijazapiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://inchiriereelicoptere.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e49349d665a---joripuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rugerwafers.com/demo/ruger/beta/userfiles/files/wepun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alkanboya.com/files/file///ledixuzelifaxutese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ats-dz.com/userfiles/file/43614583626.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://oazapiekna.com/zdjecia/fck/file/69322749498.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bbmeti.it/userfiles/files/94233505769.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://saikunghouse.hk/userfiles/minunedipopab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/kf9pk5snfcuqju4ecgpef4dvm7/61686338010.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--9w3b11kh5l.com/ckupload/files/jajodobofufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xlux.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6i1v4r0e9c8kpbk6e6uv3jgj5l/41326426960.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://taechoclub.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210822_C4B5756BD722D849.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://le-lemniscus-incandescent.fr/ckeditor/upload/files/xelutuzivepujoxemo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cfa5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCFA5 11100 bytes
SHA-256: b8997dae3d95f3cb39a90d89ca2e5604b98f47087b4d1001cf14048ef0a6cc10
font_01_sfnt_off0000e945.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE945 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00010157.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10157 17352 bytes
SHA-256: 6643209ae94774cb38b5819cb9b2e74e79e43c6dd2597de459e723a2e9703a38

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