Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 36e83efe7e6d4c3f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.4 KB First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: b603387b04550de5c36bc0b5de0f74b0 SHA-1: a88563ebdd19581d9f4b9de64e46b5ba76b5e4d3 SHA-256: 36e83efe7e6d4c3f13cb353268a3708f0ee0801012b6de8a58f589736bde242e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with data that triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of the embedded exploit. This exploit likely facilitates the download and execution of a secondary payload, as suggested by the critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002721.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2721 1360 bytes
SHA-256: ea5a4c17c0ea36faae1c5fd25b4f8858b488895bbe3cda9c2956abf300047c58

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