Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 36b3d1198c7f8fa7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

108.0 KB Created: 2020-12-14 14:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: cf5df2757ecd4401868b7837e7e1b00a SHA-1: 9b903de37a3d2f1fa156eb590bc9faf3448a1bf2 SHA-256: 36b3d1198c7f8fa73066e5000f3f63f885c937acb938fef2db7c985d8230558d
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The file was detected as malicious by ClamAV with the signature Doc.Downloader.ChristmasGift-9845923-0. Heuristics indicate the presence of Windows Script Host references and VBA auto-execution, suggesting the document is designed to run malicious code. The embedded VBA p-code with execution tokens, specifically `GetObject` within `Document_Open`, strongly implies an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload from one of the numerous unknown-reputation URLs found within the document. The document body was not parsable, limiting further analysis of its lure.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.ChristmasGift-9845923-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.ChristmasGift-9845923-0
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (AssertionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cuencadistributions.com/wp-content/plugins/mailchimp-for-wp/vendor/bin/ekcBKiRsNXoj.php
    • https://simba.simbapropertylistingsea.com/wp-content/themes/twentynineteen/sass/blocks/bVMQHi8npqSri.php
    • https://pccreed.com/n0fBZhgWWCcFo.php
    • https://fmpanamby.ga/wp-includes/sodium_compat/namespaced/Core/ChaCha20/mVjwniGX.php
    • http://script.rentpayez.com/wwVbFeF1V2mFa.php
    • https://sanjoseroofing.org/old/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/aRC84WdkOv16GY.php
    • http://electrocardsystems.com/plugins/vmcustom/specification/specification/tmpl/R674L7LjbwF.php
    • https://monacofieldson.co.uk/L8A5QV2mw.php
    • https://richardsilk.com/wp-content/plugins/updraftplus/images/addons-images/Zk8Iv9hirxx0i.php
    • https://kabiryogashramlimbdi.com/wp-includes/js/tinymce/plugins/charmap/7nem6JhxNGE.php
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform