Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 366c18d036bfa6a2…

MALICIOUS

RTF

69.3 KB Authoring application: Riched20 6.3.9600 First seen: 2021-03-01
MD5: 0d441a1e320c9b01104f28c203dfc2fe SHA-1: 781c8e46d7f2513c29793cdb23c6fce63eb729cb SHA-256: 366c18d036bfa6a2028eb54b6d9d480f112bc01bea0f40fb6d3e3645a65a05d2
380 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-9965975-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-9965975-1
  • Equation Editor object class critical RTF_OBJCLASS_EQUATION
    Object class 'equation.3' references Equation Editor
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000f27e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF27E 3981 bytes
SHA-256: f95afd92b85ca7c6ff10f782fa2c0df3bdf9f1851739120fa91535aca7d6c2bc